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Electoral Confidence and Political Budget Cycles in Non-OECD Countries 
Max Ferdinand Eibl and Halfdan Lynge-Mangueira 
Introduction 
Common wisdom has it that governments boost public spending before elections 
to improve their re-election chances. Yet evidence of political budget cycles 
(PBCs) suggests that they do so only sometimes.1 Most explanations as to why 
this is have focused on incumbents’ abilities to manipulate expenditures. Fewer 
have focused on their incentives, and little research has tested the effect of their 
electoral prospects. This is certainly the case for studies of PBCs in non-OECD 
countries. While the effect of electoral prospects has been acknowledged in the 
literature on advanced industrialized democracies (Alt & Rose, 2009; Schultz, 
1995), it has been almost completely absent from scholarship on developing 
countries.  
In this article, we seek to fill this lacuna by exploring the relationship 
between electoral prospects and PBCs in non-OECD countries.2 We argue that 
electoral confidence affects whether incumbents increase public spending before 
elections. Our argument highlights the importance of incentives and expectation 
formation on the occurrence and magnitude of PBCs. In short, we hold that if 
incumbents are confident of their re-election, they do not boost public spending; if 
they fear losing, they do.  
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Moreover, given the information-scarce environment prevalent in most 
non-OECD countries, we argue that incumbents rely primarily on past electoral 
results when gauging their re-election chances. Tested against alternative 
measures of electoral confidence, specifically favorable pre-election polls, 
incumbents seem to prefer past electoral results. While we acknowledge that 
incumbents in non-OECD countries use all information at their disposal, the 
political environment and the fact that decisions regarding election year spending 
are often taken many months before the elections, obliges them to focus primarily 
on previous electoral results. It is also possible that favorable surveys are the 
result of earlier spending decisions in response to previous election results, thus 
making opinion polls potentially endogenous to spending and electoral results. In 
any event, our findings suggest that incumbents prefer to rely on previous win-
margins when deciding whether to boost spending or not.  
We test our argument against a new dataset on public spending in non-
OECD countries (Lucas & Richter, 2016). Covering 76 countries from 1960 to 
2006, the dataset considerably improves on existing data, both in terms of country 
coverage and temporal scope. Existing studies on PBCs in developing countries 
have often been limited to specific geographic areas or time periods.3 This paper 
therefore represents, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive test of 
political budget cycles in developing countries. Like Rogoff (1990) and others, we 
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focus on spending rather than revenues or debt.4 Our findings show that the 
occurrence and the strength of PBCs are conditional upon the incumbent’s 
electoral confidence. More specifically, we find a negative relationship between 
past win-margins and pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. Incumbents who won the 
last elections by a comfortable margin and who are therefore confident of their re-
election did not boost public spending before elections; incumbents who won only 
by a narrow margin and feared they could lose the elections manipulated the state 
budget and increased public expenditures. In other words, we provide evidence of 
a linear relationship between electoral confidence and spending cycles: the higher 
an incumbent’s confidence, the smaller the spending increase before elections. 
Testing an alternative, survey-based measure does not yield the same results, 
suggesting that past win-margins represent a better indicator of incumbents’ 
electoral confidence in the context of non-OECD countries.  
The article proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the existing 
PBC literature and highlights the neglect of incentives and the effect of electoral 
prospects outside the context of OECD countries. The second section discusses 
the formation of electoral prospects in political contexts outside the OECD. The 
third section describes the dataset and uses quantitative methods to examine the 
effect of electoral confidence on state spending. The fourth section concludes by 
highlighting the added value of this study.  
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Neglected Incentives for PBCs 
PBCs in developing countries have often been approached as a moral hazard 
problem (Shi & Svensson, 2006). The model assumes that incumbents control 
public spending and value re-election, and that voters value the goods and 
services that public spending buys.5 Voters are impaired by asymmetric 
information, meaning that they cannot discern whether more public goods stem 
from incumbents’ competence or from fiscal manipulation. The result is a cycle 
where incumbents increase public spending before elections to improve their re-
election chances, and reduce spending thereafter to prevent deficits and inflation.6  
 The argument behind the model is compelling. Yet evidence of PBCs is 
mixed. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992; 1997), and Alt and Lassen (2006) 
have found PBCs in OECD countries, while Schuknecht (1996, 1999) has found 
PBCs in developing countries. Vergne (2009) has also found PBCs in developing 
countries but only in certain types of spending. In datasets containing both OECD 
and non-OECD countries, Brender and Drazen (2007) have found some evidence 
of PBCs, while Klomp and de Haan (2012) have found no evidence at all.  
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 In view of these mixed findings, PBC research has increasingly turned to 
exploring the conditions under which incumbents engage in fiscal manipulation 
(Alt & Rose, 2009; Franzese, 2002; Hibbs, 2006). Most of this research has 
focused on incumbents' abilities to manipulate public spending. Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) and Franzese (2002) have highlighted institutional features of 
political systems that facilitate or hamper fiscal manipulation.7 Others have 
suggested that democratization reduces this ability, pointing to democratic 
stability (Adi Brender & Drazen, 2007; A. Brender & Drazen, 2005), voter 
experience (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya, 2004; Shi & Svensson, 2006), party 
institutionalization (Shelton, n.d.), and fiscal transparency (Alt & Lassen, 2006). 
Introducing an international dimension to PBC research, Hyde and O’Mahoney 
(2010) and Schuknecht (1996) have shown that IMF agreements reduce 
incumbents’ ability to manipulate public spending. 
 Far fewer studies have focused on incentives. Ito (1990) and Chowdhury 
(1993) have argued that the ability to call early elections (endogenous timing) 
lowers incumbents’ incentive to create PBCs, as they can call elections when 
natural spending cycles are favorable. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1993) have 
tested this argument cross-nationally but found no evidence to support it. Kayser 
(2005) has suggested that term limits reduce the incentive to manipulate, although 
he also finds little evidence to corroborate his claim. Finally, Shi and Svensson 
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(2006) have argued that budget transparency reduces incumbents’ ability to 
appropriate rents while in office and therefore their incentive to create PBCs. An 
alternative interpretation of their findings is that transparency requirements simply 
reduce incumbents’ ability to manipulate budgets and thus has nothing to do with 
incentives. 
 The effect of electoral prospects and incumbents’ electoral confidence has 
rarely been tested. This is surprising as the argument dates back to the early days 
of PBC research. Already Rogoff (1990) notes that political cycles should not be 
observed when incumbents are safe. Similarly, Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 
(1993, p. 21), in one of the first tests of the Rogoff model, speculate that PBCs 
“occur when incumbents are unsure of reappointment and need an extra electoral 
boost.” The argument has been tested in the context of OECD countries but never 
cross-nationally. Schultz (1995) and Price (1998), for example, use public opinion 
data to test the effect of government popularity on election year spending in the 
UK. They both find that government popularity affects spending but disagree on 
how.8 Similarly, Alt and Rose (2009) find that approval rates influence US 
governors’ decision to spend before elections. Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga (2011) and 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) use past win-margins to measure the effect of 
competitiveness on election year spending in Portuguese and Swedish 
municipalities, finding that local governments hike up spending when previous 
  7 
elections were close. Schneider (2010) tests the same effect in German federal 
states but finds no statistically significant effect. The argument has never been 
tested outside the context of OECD countries but its logic should be the same. All 
else being equal, incumbents should have a stronger incentive to manipulate 
public spending when their electoral prospects are poor, and a weaker incentive 
when they are confident of their re-election. 
 
Formation of Electoral Prospects in Different Contexts 
The argument raises an important question how do incumbents know about their 
electoral prospects? In OECD countries, they have a fairly good idea. Since the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, companies such as Gallup have conducted pre-
election polls across Western Europe and North America,9 and by the early 1980s, 
commercial polls were conducted in nearly all Western democracies (Crespi, 
1989). Today, polls are copious and easily available. In the run-up to the 2012 US 
presidential elections, for instance, more than 300 polls were conducted (RCP, 
2013). In addition, electoral sociology tends to be more advanced in OECD 
countries. Candidates have a fairly good understanding of voter preferences and 
electoral behavior, and use focus group interviews to test the effect of different 
messages before conveying them to the public. Finally, they draw on statistical 
models to predict electoral results on the basis of demographic and economic data.  
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 This is not the case in most non-OECD countries. As Heath, Fisher, and 
Smith (2005, p. 311) note, survey research “is not yet completely global” and 
certain areas, notably the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, have until very 
recently remained underrepresented in international public opinion research. Even 
in long-standing developing democracies, such as India, polls were often non-
existent before the 1990s. The polls that are conducted in non-OECD countries 
are often fraught with problems regarding coverage, nonresponse rates, sampling, 
and measurement. Illiterate and rural populations, in particular, tend to be 
underrepresented in most polls (Heath et al., 2005). For example, in Egypt in 
2012, companies such as the Pew Global Attitudes Survey sampled respondents 
only from the greater Cairo area, which may have been one of the reasons why 
virtually all polls predicted a run-off between two candidates who both did not 
make it to the final round.10 Similarly, in Zambia in 2006, polls conducted mainly 
in urban areas predicted a landslide victory for the opposition challenger, 
prompting incredulity among his supporters when the incumbent president was 
declared the winner (Larmer & Fraser, 2007). Representative sampling may also 
be complicated by armed conflict, political unrest, or poor infrastructure, which 
makes regions inaccessible for pollsters. Finally, laws regulating public opinion 
polls are often highly restrictive.11 
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The lack of reliable information is particularly heightened in the case of 
founding elections. Returning from periods of non-democratic rule, incumbents 
are highly uncertain about the ability of their party machines to deliver the votes. 
Voters may use the elections to sanction old regimes and members of the political 
elite may seize the opportunity to defect from the hitherto ruling party. 
Unprecedented levels of voter turnout following democratic openings exacerbate 
this uncertainty. In such insecure environments, incumbents desperately hunt for 
reliable information. In Ghana, for instance, the ruling National Democratic 
Congress solicited the Ghana Private Road Transporters’ Union prior to the 1992 
elections, which marked Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy, and had taxi 
drivers all over the country listen in on their passengers’ conversations (Jeffries & 
Thomas, 1993). 
Overall, incumbents in non-OECD countries face a dearth of information 
when they try to assess their re-election prospects. In this information-scarce 
environment, we hypothesize that incumbents rely on past electoral results to 
gauge their re-election prospects. If they won the last elections by a comfortable 
margin, they are unlikely to spend much; if they won by a narrow margin, they are 
likely to manipulate budgets to improve their re-election chances. By comparison, 
opinion polls do not provide the same quality of information. First, they are often 
not available when decisions regarding election year spending are made, usually 
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many months before the elections. Second, even if polls were available, they may 
be inaccurate and fraught with problems, as described above.  
This is not to say that incumbents only rely on past win-margins when they 
gauge their electoral prospects. They will most certainly use all information 
available to them and consider the shape of the economy, assess the impact of 
possible economic shocks, listen to party members, analyze the press, and assess 
the implications of possible corruption or mismanagement scandals. In the end, 
the whole process is about evaluating and weighing information according to its 
reliability. We simply hypothesize that the specific context of non-OECD 
countries entails that the informational weight of past electoral results is higher 
than the insights gained from pre-election polls, if available. Incumbents thus 
follow a pattern of Bayesian learning under conditions of poor information.12 
Anecdotal evidence supports this argument. In Ghana in 2004, GDP 
growth rates were high, above 4 percent in the years before elections, and polls 
consistently predicted a victory for the incumbent, the National Patriotic Party 
(NPP)’s John Kufuor. The government, nonetheless, increased the budget deficit 
from 8 percent of GDP in the year before the elections to 9.2 percent in the year of 
the elections. This increase should be seen in the light of Kufuor’s 13.8 percent 
win-margin in 2000, which may seem relatively comfortable but, in fact, was the 
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smallest in Ghana’s history and the first time a government was defeated at the 
polls. 
Conversely, in Trinidad and Tobago in 1992, polls suggested that the 
ruling National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) would lose its 91.7 percent 
majority in parliament (33 of 36 seats). The year before the elections, the 
economy went into recession, which made it more difficult for the government to 
improve the budget balance. This notwithstanding, the government slashed 
spending by nearly 1.6 percent in the year of the election.  
Even in the more advanced economies, where polls are more frequent and 
reliable, there are indications that incumbents weigh past results as much as they 
weigh pre-election polls. In Cyprus in 1998 and 2003, the polls predicted a victory 
for the incumbent president, the Democratic Rally’s Glafcos Clerides. Yet, 
spending hikes of 1.2 percent of GDP in 1998 and 1.8 percent in 2003 suggest the 
government looked more at its 0.6 percent win-margin in 1993 and 1.6 percent 
win-margin in 1998 when they set the spending level before the 1998 and 2003 
elections. 
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Analysis 
This section explores the relationship between incumbents’ electoral confidence 
and pre-electoral fiscal manipulation, using time-series cross-sectional analysis of 
spending data in 76 non-OECD countries, 1960-2006. The findings support our 
argument that electoral confidence has a major impact on both the occurrence and 
size of PBCs in non-OECD countries. As highlighted above, we argue that poor 
and insufficient information and, by consequence, the inability of incumbents to 
estimate their re-election chances characterize the strategic environment in most 
of the countries in our sample. We therefore expect incumbents to use past 
electoral results rather than pre-election polls to gauge their re-election prospects 
and, by consequence, to decide whether to manipulate budgets or not. 
 
Data 
To operationalize our dependent variable, we use a new dataset on Global State 
Revenues and Expenditures (GSRE) (Lucas & Richter, 2016) in developing 
countries. This dataset draws on the country reports that are prepared annually by 
the regional departments of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stored in the 
IMF’s archives. The documents were made available to researchers in the early 
2000s. The reports are generally available from the year in which a country joined 
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the IMF, while the most recent documents are declassified after a period of five 
years. 
 The GSRE is thus an alternative data source to the widely used IMF 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), published by the IMF’s statistical 
department. Compared to the GFS, the GSRE substantially increases the number 
of available observations by extending the time series back in time, for some 
countries until the end of World War II, while the GFS only dates back to 1972. 
Moreover, the GSRE provides one continuous time series of comparable data, 
while the GFS, due to changes in the IMF’s classification scheme, has one time 
series running from 1972 to 2001 and another from 1990 until present. Another 
advantage of the GSRE is the arguably higher validity, as the data are collected by 
country teams during field missions as opposed to surveys sent out for the GFS. 
Admittedly, a disadvantage of the GSRE is that different regional departments 
might apply different accounting standards that could lead to distortions of the 
measures across countries. This is certainly the case for specific taxes or 
expenditures. However, for aggregate variables, such as budget deficit, the 
distortions are minimal as different spending classifications matter much less. In 
all, the GSRE represents a valuable alternative to the widely used GFS.13 
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Variables 
Our main dependent variable, Budget Balance, represents the difference between 
total government revenues minus total expenditures, measured as a share of the 
country’s GDP. Negative values of the budget balance thus designate fiscal 
deficits; positive values surpluses. Data are all taken from the GSRE with two 
minor exceptions. For periods in the 2000s where government data from the 
archival material are not available yet, we supplement with data from the GFS. 
We also use GFS data for India which is not included in the GSRE.  
 The variable Election is based on the National Elections Across 
Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 2011) and 
indicates whether a competitive, politically important election occurred in a given 
country-year. We restrict our analysis to “competitive” elections as our argument 
assumes some risk of being voted out of office. When electoral results are rigged 
or opposition candidates and parties outlawed, elections do not represent a test of 
an incumbent’s popularity and our argument does not apply. We therefore exclude 
elections when no opposition was allowed, only one party was legal, or there was 
no choice of candidates on the ballot.14 Countries that have never had a 
competitive election are also not part of the sample. In addition, we exclude all 
countries from the estimation with a Polity score (Marshall & Jaggers, 2010) of -6 
and below.15 In these clearly autocratic cases, meaningful political competition is 
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very unlikely to be guaranteed, even when elections are formally competitive, as 
hegemonic autocrats have many ways to vitiate competition before elections occur 
(Schedler, 2002). We also restrict our analysis to “politically important” elections, 
meaning elections where the chief executive’s office is at stake.16 Given limited 
resources, we expect PBCs to be particularly pronounced when the leadership of a 
country is at stake. 
Our main conditional variable, Confidence, measures the incumbent’s win-
margin in percent in the last elections. It ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating higher levels of confidence. In the case of presidential elections, the 
variable measures the difference in vote share between the winner and the runner-
up in the last elections. If elections are held over two rounds, we take the 
difference in the second round. In the case of parliamentary elections, we take the 
difference between the government and the opposition’s seat share in parliament. 
We use data on seat shares instead of vote shares as the latter are often 
unavailable. We acknowledge that, depending on the electoral system, there may 
be considerable distortions between the two. However, as seat shares, not vote 
shares, ultimately determine who holds power, we believe the use of seat shares is 
justifiable. This being said, we also run the regressions without parliamentary 
elections as a robustness test (Online Appendix, Table A4).  
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Data on electoral results are taken from the Election Results Archive 
(Center of Democratic Performance, 2012), Psephos (Carr, 2013), and the World 
Bank (2013). As the variable seeks to capture incumbents’ confidence of being re-
elected, it takes the value of zero whenever the elections are the first multiparty 
elections in a country or whenever they are the first competitive elections after at 
least one round of non-competitive elections. As we have argued above, in both 
cases incumbents are believed to have very little or no reliable information and, as 
a result, are expected to be very insecure about their electoral prospects. The 
variable is also coded zero in non-election years, as it is meaningless to measure 
the incumbent’s fear of losing an election in a non-election year. This coding 
follows the standard practice in the field (see, for instance, Efthyvoulou, 2011). 
That being said, we run the regressions also with a continuous measure of 
confidence as a robustness test (Online Appendix, Table A8).  
We also test an alternative measure of electoral prospects, Favorable 
survey. To construct this measure, we first collected data on 147 pre-election 
polls, covering 50 countries over the period from 1961 to 2009. The data were 
post-weighted, according to geographical region and time period (pre- and post-
1991) to reduce biases stemming from non-random sampling. Taking the 
difference between the predicted win-margin in the poll and the actual win-margin 
as a dependent variable, we then estimated a model of poll accuracy using 
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country-level characteristics, election characteristics, and decade dummies as 
predictors.17 From this model, we extracted an error term, which we normalized 
and interacted with a binary variable from the NELDA dataset (Hyde & Marinov, 
2011) indicating whether there were reliable polls favorable to the incumbent.18 
By interacting the NELDA dummy variable with our error prediction, we get a 
more fine-grained, survey-based measure of electoral confidence that – 
importantly given the context – takes into account the expected quality of polls in 
a given election year. This procedure is admittedly not perfect. Ideally, we would 
have fine-grained survey data for all elections in our sample that we could average 
over a defined period prior to the election. Unfortunately, exact poll data are hard 
to come by: even the 147 pre-election polls that we identified only represent about 
60 percent of the cases in which according to NELDA reliable surveys existed, 
and NELDA itself only provides the survey variables in binary form – favorable 
or not. Failing better alternatives, we thus follow a strategy of weighting the 
NELDA survey dummy by the expected error margin of the survey.  
The analysis also includes a number of standard socio-economic and 
political control variables. First, we include a variable measuring Executive 
oversight, taken from the Varieties of Democracy (VDem) dataset (Coppedge et 
al., 2015), which controls for an incumbent’s ability to manipulate public 
spending. More specifically, the variable measures the likelihood that illegal or 
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unconstitutional activity by the executive would be investigated by a body other 
than the legislature. Second, we control for GDP per capita (logged), taken from 
the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2006), as governments in 
wealthier countries might find it easier to finance higher deficits in election years 
by exploiting their larger tax base or turning to international markets. Third, we 
control for Growth, also taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2006). 
The argument here is two-fold: on the one hand, economic growth is likely to 
affect the budget balance through higher revenues from taxes, again making is 
easier for governments to boost spending before elections; on the other, growth is 
likely to affect the incumbent’s popularity and therefore electoral confidence as 
voters might reward the government for its economic performance. In other 
words, poor growth rates or recession could increase the incentive to create 
PBCs.19  
Fourth, as varying levels of government revenues might affect the 
incumbent’s ability to create PBCs, we include three variables that capture the 
government’s distributive capacity: Tax revenues/GDP, taken from the GSRE 
(Lucas & Richter, 2016), which measures the sum of all direct and non-direct 
taxes weighted by a country’s GDP; Rents p.c. (logged), taken from Haber and 
Menaldo (2011), which measures government income from extractable resources 
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in 2007 $US per capita; and Aid p.c. (logged), taken from the World Bank (2010), 
which measures the level of foreign aid in constant $US per capita.  
Fifth, we include a dummy variable for IMF agreements, taken from an 
updated version of Dreher (2006), as the existence of such agreements might also 
reduce the incumbent's ability to manipulate the budget. Sixth, the incumbent's 
ability to create PBCs might be affected by a country’s debt ratio, which is why 
we control for Debt service, taken from the World Bank (2010) and measured as a 
share of the gross national income. Seventh, as already explained, we exclude 
uncompetitive elections but in addition include a Polity indicator (Marshall, Gurr, 
& Jaggers, 2010), to make sure the results are not driven by regime variations. 
Eighth, with the variable Tenure, taken from Archigos dataset (Goemans, 
Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), we control for the number of years the incumbent 
has been in office, as it might be that more experienced incumbents are more 
skillful in manipulating public spending (Aidt et al., 2011). Finally, we control for 
post-election swing-back effects in spending by including a dummy indicator for 
Post-election years.20  
 
Model 
We estimate our regression using the following standard model as suggested in 
the literature (Shi & Svensson, 2006): 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖𝑡−3 +  𝛽4𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑁𝑖 +  𝑇𝑡 +  εit ,  
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡  represents the budget balance, 𝛽0 is a constant; 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑌𝑖𝑡−2, 𝑌𝑖𝑡−3 
are the one-, two-, and three-period lags of the dependent variable; 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector 
of control variables, 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑇𝑡 are country and period fixed effects, and εit is he 
error term. Three important points: first, as public spending is characterized by 
inertia, we include three lags of the dependent variable to purge the regression of 
serial correlation;21 second, we include country fixed effects to control for 
possible country-specific confounders,22 and time fixed effects to control for 
periodical shocks in the panel; third, we use robust standard errors to adjust for 
within-country correlation and deal with heteroskedasticity.23  
We estimate the regression using ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Autoregressive OLS models combined with country fixed effects make the 
parameter estimates potentially liable to bias (Nickell, 1981). With an average T 
of 14 years per country, the Nickel bias in our cases is rather small (7.1 percent),24 
and Beck and Katz (2011) have shown that alternative estimators can perform 
worse in the presence of long time series. When using a difference GMM model 
as a robustness test (Online Appendix, Table A10), the substantive findings 
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remain unchanged. Finally, please note that Confidence as a base term drops out 
of the regression as it is coded 0 in non-election years.25 
 
Findings 
Table 1 presents our results. In Model 1, we estimate our base model without 
conditioning on the effect of electoral confidence. The coefficient of Election is 
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that, without factoring in 
incumbents’ electoral confidence, competitive and politically important elections 
have a negative impact on the budget balance. On average, the government’s 
budget balance is about 0.4 percent of GDP lower in election years. Given a mean 
budget balance of -5 percent in the entire sample, this means an 8 percent increase 
of deficit spending in election years. In other words, all else being equal, it seems 
that incumbents generally increase the deficit before elections. Compared to 
previous mixed findings, this clear evidence of PBCs certainly results from the 
much larger number of observations in our dataset and the inclusion of new 
countries. However, it is in line with previous research, such as Schuknecht (1996, 
1999) and Vergne (2009), who have found evidence of PBCs in developing 
countries. Notably, the coefficient of Post-election is positive, statistically 
significant, and comparable in size to the Election coefficient. This suggest that 
governments tighten the belt in the year after the elections. 
  22 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
In Model 2, we estimate our model with the conditioning effect of 
electoral confidence. Again, the coefficient of Election is negative and statistically 
significant, while the interaction of Election and Confidence is positive and 
statistically significant. Supporting our argument, this suggests that higher levels 
of electoral confidence improve the budget balance in election years, whilst the 
effect of elections is still negatively significant. In other words, more confident 
incumbents create smaller deficits or larger surpluses in election years. At the 
lowest level of electoral confidence, the budget deficit grows by about 0.8 percent 
of GDP. This means a 16 percent increase of deficit spending, given a mean 
deficit of -5 percent in the sample. From there, the deficit shrinks by about 0.02 
percent for every percentage increase of electoral confidence. So, by moving from 
a situation of very low confidence to a win-margin of 20 percent, the size of the 
PBC is reduced by about 50 percent on average.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Electoral confidence does not only reduce the PBCs. At high levels of 
electoral confidence, the cycles disappear. This is best illustrated graphically. 
Figure 1 displays the budget balance as a function of varying levels of electoral 
confidence.26 The solid line represents the average effect; the two dotted lines the 
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95 percent confidence bounds.27 The graph also includes a histogram to illustrate 
the distribution of electoral confidence in our sample.28 Clearly, most elections are 
won by a narrow margin, meaning that most incumbents are relatively insecure 
about their re-election, and it is indeed these incumbents who manipulate 
spending before elections.  
For confidence levels up to a level of 22 percent, incumbents increase the 
budget deficit in election years. However, deficit increases shrink in size with 
higher levels of electoral confidence. Past 22 percent, the upper confidence bound 
crosses the zero line, suggesting that incumbents might actually reduce their 
budget deficits in election years. The solid line suggests that PBCs occur, on 
average, up to confidence levels of 48 percent. We draw two conclusions from 
this. First, in view of the lower confidence bound, growing levels of confidence 
reduce the size of the budget cycle. This effect should be observable nearly across 
the whole sample.29 Second, for past win-margins above 22 percent, we cannot be 
certain that PBCs actually occur. In other words, higher confidence levels also 
affect the occurrence of PBCs, though such confidence levels are empirically 
relatively rare.  
 How, then, does our alternative measure of electoral confidence fare? To 
answer this question, we replicate our base model using Favorable survey instead 
of Confidence. The results are shown in Table 2. As expected, favorable surveys 
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do not have the same conditional effect on PBCs as past win-margins. The 
coefficient of the interaction term between Election and Favorable surveys is 
negative and not statistically significant, indicating that favorable surveys may, in 
fact, reinforce PBCs rather than weakening them. Conditioning on favorable 
surveys also pushes the Election coefficient below conventional levels of 
statistical significance, although it is likely this change results from the reduced 
sample size.30 Substantively, these findings suggest that incumbents resort to past 
win-margins rather than surveys to gauge their electoral chances, and decide 
whether or not to boost spending before elections. As argued above, this seems 
realistic given that polls in developing countries are often fraught with problems 
and the fact that decisions regarding election year spending are usually taken 
months before the elections. Whilst we cannot fully ascertain this claim because 
we have no information on the date the survey was carried out, the usually lengthy 
budget making procedures make it more difficult to react to, at times, fast-
changing survey popularity. We also cannot rule out the possibility of reverse 
causation, such that favorable pre-election polls are themselves the result of 
earlier spending decisions by the incumbent. That said, incumbents’ little trust in 
surveys must definitely play a role as we have a number of low-constraints 
executives in our sample that certainly could, in theory, respond with 
discretionary spending outside the regular budget-making channels.  
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Robustness Tests 
To ascertain the robustness of our findings, we conduct a number of additional 
robustness tests. First, following common practice, we include additional control 
variables: a dummy variable for minority governments, assuming that minority 
governments may have more difficulties passing an inflated election year budget; 
variables for the percentage of the population that is urban and dependent, 
assuming that large rural and dependent populations may force governments to 
spend more on infrastructure, education, and health, which could constrain their 
ability to create PBCs; and a variable for the percentage of imports and exports, 
weighted by the country’s GDP, which might also affect the incumbent’s fiscal 
leeway. All variables are taken from Hyde and Marinov (2011) and the World 
Bank (2010, 2013).31 The results are shown in Table 3. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Second, considering the emphasis on abilities in the literature on PBCs, we 
run a number of robustness checks on our ability control. Specifically, we replace 
Executive oversight, first, with Legislative constraints, which measures the extent 
to which the legislature is capable of exercising oversight; second, with 
Constitutional respect, which measures the extent to which the executive respects 
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the constitution; third, with Judicial constraints, which measures the extent to 
which the executive complies with court rulings and to which the judiciary is 
independent; fourth, with Judiciary compliance, which measures how often the 
executive complies with court decisions with which it disagrees; and, fifth, with 
Judicial review, which measures whether any court has the legal authority to 
invalidate executive decisions (see Table 4). All variables are from the VDem 
dataset (Coppedge et al., 2015). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Third, as some incumbents may choose the stick rather than the carrot, we 
rerun our base model with two additional control variables: Repression, which 
measures the level of political terror on a five-point scale; and Party ban, which 
measures whether any parties are banned, also on a five-point scale (see Table 
5).32 Repression is taken from the Political Terror Scale dataset (Gibney, Cornett, 
Reed, Haschke, & Arnon, 2015); Party ban from the VDem dataset (Coppedge et 
al., 2015). 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
None of the robustness tests described above alters the substantive finding 
of this paper: if electoral confidence is low enough, incumbents create PBCs to 
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boost their chances of re-election. Additional robustness checks are detailed in the 
Online Appendix. These include a model without parliamentary elections (Table 
A4); a model with different model specifications using year fixed effects, country 
fixed effects, and random effects only (Table A5); a model using panel-corrected 
and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors instead of our baseline errors (Table A6); a 
model without outliers (Table A7); a model where we replace our measure of 
electoral confidence, which is coded zero in non-election years, with a continuous 
measure (Table A8); a model, where we exclude founding elections and elections 
after an autocratic interlude (Table A9); a difference GMM model to address 
potential Nickel bias (Table A10); and, finally, a model that includes an 
interaction term between our ability measure and elections to capture the 
restraining effect of Executive oversight in election years specifically. The results 
of these additional tests are all in line with the findings of our base model.  
Conclusion 
This paper has yielded three key findings. First, incumbents’ electoral confidence 
conditions their decision to manipulate public spending before elections. The 
causal mechanism is straightforward. Motivation to engage in pre-electoral 
spending manipulation increases as elections become tighter and incumbents’ 
electoral prospects become more uncertain. Conversely, if incumbents are 
confident that they will win, they are reluctant to waste relatively scarce public 
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resources to boost their popularity, which would make it difficult to govern after 
the elections. Electoral confidence therefore affects both the size and the 
occurrence of political budget cycles. Overall, our argument contributes to the 
growing literature on the context-conditionality of PBCs (Alt & Rose, 2009). 
Using a new, comprehensive dataset on public expenditures, this paper also 
represents the most comprehensive test of PBCs in non-OECD countries thus far. 
The second finding concerns the way incumbents form expectations. 
While we have underlined that incumbents in non-OECD countries use all 
information available to them, we show that they give past win-margins a 
particular weight in their calculations. Favorable pre-election polls, on the other 
hand, do not seem to influence incumbents’ decision-making when it comes to 
PBCs. As we have pointed out, this probably has to do with the problem of survey 
reliability in non-OECD countries, a possible reverse causation between earlier 
spending decision and polls, and the fact that budgeting, in general, precedes 
elections by considerable time span. Being a relatively “hard” and reliable 
measure in an otherwise information-scarce environment, past win-margins act as 
the most important indicator of incumbents’ future electoral prospects.  
Finally, this paper challenges some of the previous findings of PBC 
research. For instance, our research suggests that the pronounced spending cycles 
before founding elections are primarily a result of incumbents’ weak electoral 
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confidence rather than a lack of voter awareness and experience (Block et al., 
2003). More generally, we have tried to shift the debate from institutional abilities 
back to motivational incentives, which have been largely neglected in the 
literature on PBCs in developing countries. Future research should explore other 
incentives that condition PBCs, such as party types or voter preferences. Also, it 
would be worthwhile to unpack aggregate spending and explore what types of 
spending incumbents prefer to boost their popularity. Finally, still very little is 
known about the electoral impact of spending manipulations. The findings of this 
paper suggest that incumbents in non-OECD countries believe that spending 
influences the outcome of elections. However, this assumption remains to be 
tested. 
                                                 
1 Following Alt and Rose (2009), we define PBCs as “regular, periodic fluctuation in a 
government’s fiscal policies induced by the cycle of elections.” 
2 We exclude all countries that are currently members of the OECD from the analysis. The group 
of countries we analyze is thus not entirely commensurate, yet certainly overlapping to a large 
extent, with economically less developed countries. 
3 See, for instance, Block et al. (2003) on Africa and Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) on 
Russia. Hyde and O’Mahoney (2010) study only the period after 1990. 
4 It is generally agreed that PBCs are stronger in spending than in revenues (Alt & Rose, 2009). 
Thus, if we do not find PBCs in spending it is unlikely that we will find PBCs in revenues. 
5 We consider PBCs, patronage, and vote-buying distinct phenomena (with corresponding distinct 
bodies of literature) but recognize that they intersect when patronage and vote-buying is 
government-funded. Our analysis captures only this intersection. Whether budget increases are 
used to fund public goods (roads, schools, hospitals, etc.) or private goods (wages, pensions, jobs, 
etc.) is a question of budget allocation, which we do not analyze in this paper.  
6 The alternative partisan model of PBCs (Alberto Alesina, 1987; Hibbs, 1977) assumes relatively 
cohesive political parties with clearly delineated ideologies and is therefore unsuited for studies of 
PBCs in non-OECD countries (Block, 2002; Vergne, 2009).  
7 Persson and Tabellini (2003) argue that in parliamentary systems incumbents control both the 
executive and the legislature, making it easier to push through budgets and public accounts. 
  30 
                                                                                                                                     
Franzese (2002) argues that the separation of powers that characterizes presidential systems 
prevent incumbents from manipulating public spending. 
8 Schultz (1995) suggests that the effect is positive and linear (unpopular governments boost public 
spending, as they fear losing elections; popular governments do not), while Price (1998) argues 
that it is bell-shaped (very unpopular governments also do not boost public spending as the costs 
of hiking up spending to the required level outweigh the benefits of being re-elected). 
9 First surveys occurred in the US (1936), the UK (1937), and France (1938), followed by 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Switzerland, the Netherlands, West Germany, Finland, Norway, and 
Italy by 1946 (see Worcester, 1989). 
10 In a survey conducted by the University of Maryland just before the elections, Amr Moussa was 
predicted to obtain 28 percent (obtained 11.13 percent), and Abdel Moneim Abdel Fotouh was 
given 32 percent (obtained 17.47 percent). 
11 Particularly problematic are restrictions that forbid the publication of polls prior to elections. 
These blackout periods vary from one day to up to four weeks in some countries. According to the 
World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR), pre-election restrictions have 
increased, and in 2012 virtually every other country reported the existence of blackout periods 
before elections (Chung, 2012). This means that even if pre-election polls exist, incumbents might 
be unable to access the information that would allow them to gauge their re-election prospects. 
12 Note that we do not make any assumption about expectation formation of voters, which has been 
a matter of ongoing discussion in political science and economics (Franzese, 2002; Krause, 1997). 
13 Correlation between both data sources is still high, generally in the area of 0.70 and above. This 
implies that both datasets can be used interchangeably for periods past 1972. 
14 The three properties are coded in Hyde and Marinov (2011).  
15 In the classification scheme proposed by Marshall and Jaggers (2010), the polity threshold of -6 
separates autocracies from hybrid regimes. 
16 In practice, this means that we do not consider parliamentary elections in presidential political 
systems. To select politically important elections, we combine data from the Arthur Banks Dataset 
(2011) on the type and the mode of selection of the chief executive.  
17 Since there is no literature on cross-country predictors of survey accuracy, we selected our 
predictors inductively, bearing in mind theoretical plausibility and a high predictive power as 
measured by R-squared. The final R-squared was quite satisfactory with 49 percent of the error 
predicted by our model. Details on the model including a full list of variables are available in the 
Online Appendix (Table A3). 
18 This binary indicator combines information from two variables in the NELDA dataset, namely 
Nelda 25 and Nelda 26. 
19 However, a stumbling economy might considerably limit the incumbent’s capacity to engage in 
discretionary fiscal policies, making the latter scenario somewhat unlikely  
20 A summary statistic of our variables, as well as a list of all included countries is available in the 
Online Appendix (Table A1 and A2). 
21 An Arellano-Bond test suggests the inclusion of three lags to remove all serial correlation in the 
error term.  
22 A Hausman test suggests the use of country fixed effects.  
23 Panel-specific heteroskedasticity was detected using a modified Wald test. 
24 The bias amounts to 1/T.  
25 In the Online Appendix, we run an alternative model with a continuous measure of electoral 
confidence, carried forward from the last elections (Table A8). The substantive findings of this 
paper remain robust to this model adjustment. 
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26 This graph follows the suggestions of Berry et al. (2012). 
27 The scale for the effect on the budget balance can be found on the left y-axis.  
28 The scale for the histogram can be found on the right y-axis.  
29 To be precise, we should see this effect in 95 percent of our cases.  
30 As the survey indicator is not available for all countries in the sample, we lose 225 observations 
and three countries when adding the variable. 
31 These additional control variables are not included in our base model as they are considered less 
important in the literature and are therefore rarely included in standard models of PBCs. 
32 Recall that we exclude elections where no opposition was allowed, where only one party was 
legal, or where there was no choice of candidates on the ballot. Effectively, Party ban therefore 
becomes a three-point scale, ranging from “yes, many parties are banned” to “no, no parties are 
officially banned”. 
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Tables and Graphs 
 
Table 1: Electoral Confidence and PBCs 
 
(1) (2) 
Budget balance t-1 0.542*** 0.542*** 
 
(0.049) (0.048) 
Budget balance t-2 -0.054 -0.056 
 
(0.043) (0.042) 
Budget balance t-3 0.117*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.036) (0.036) 
Election -0.004* -0.008*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Election*Confidence 
 
0.0002** 
  
(0.0001) 
Post-election 0.005* 0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Executive oversight -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
GDP p.c. (logged) -0.007 -0.008 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Growth 0.079*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Tax revenues/GDP 0.170** 0.174** 
 
(0.071) (0.070) 
Rents p.c. (logged) 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Aid p.c. (logged) -0.003** -0.003** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
IMF -0.0005 -0.0001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Debt service 0.0005** 0.0004** 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
Polity -0.0004 -0.0004 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Tenure -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
 
Observations 1,015 1,015 
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant and 
FE coefficients omitted from table. 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Electoral Confidence on PBCs 
  
  37 
Table 2: Alternative Measure of Confidence 
Budget balance t-1 0.510*** 
 
(0.047) 
Budget balance t-2 -0.001 
 
(0.042) 
Budget balance t-3 0.106** 
 
(0.045) 
Election -0.004 
 
(0.005) 
Election*Favorable 
survey 
-0.003 
 
(0.005) 
Post-election 0.007** 
 
(0.003) 
Executive oversight -0.013 
 
(0.009) 
GDP p.c. (logged) 0.098*** 
 
(0.019) 
Growth -0.001 
 
(0.0004) 
Tax revenues/GDP 0.0002 
 
(0.0005) 
Rents p.c. (logged) -0.0001 
 
(0.001) 
Aid p.c. (logged) -0.002** 
 
(0.001) 
IMF -0.0005 
 
(0.003) 
Debt service 0.169** 
 
(0.085) 
Polity -0.0005 
 
(0.0004) 
Tenure -0.005 
 
(0.012) 
Observations 803 
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Constant and FE coefficients omitted from 
table. Surveys are weighted by expected measurement error. 
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Table 3: Additional Controls Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Budget balance t-1 0.542*** 0.538*** 0.538*** 0.538*** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Budget balance t-2 -0.056 -0.054 -0.055 -0.055 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Budget balance t-3 0.117*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Election -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Election*Confidence 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Minority 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Urbanization 
 
-0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** 
  
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Dependency 
  
-0.001 -0.001 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
Trade 
   
0.00003 
    
(0.0001) 
Observations 1,015 1,015 1,015 1,015 
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Constant, FE coefficients, and standard 
controls coefficients omitted from table. 
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Table 4: Alternative Indicators for Abilities 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Budget balance t-1 0.550*** 0.552*** 0.550*** 0.548*** 0.548*** 
 
(0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Budget balance t-2 -0.055 -0.053 -0.055 -0.056 -0.054 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Budget balance t-3 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) 
Election -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Election*Confidence 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 0.0002** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Legislative 
constraints 
-0.003 
    
 
(0.018) 
    
Constitutional 
respect  
0.003 
   
  
(0.003) 
   
Judicial constraints 
  
-0.004 
  
   
(0.014) 
  
Judiciary compliance 
   
-0.005* 
 
    
(0.003) 
 
Judicial review 
    
-0.008 
     
(0.006) 
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050 
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Constant, FE coefficients, and standard 
controls omitted from table. 
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Table 5: Controlling for Repression 
 
(1) (2) 
Budget balance t-1 0.537*** 0.542*** 
 
(0.049) (0.048) 
Budget balance t-2 -0.074* -0.056 
 
(0.043) (0.041) 
Budget balance t-3 0.118*** 0.117*** 
 
(0.040) (0.036) 
Election -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Election*Confidence 0.0002*** 0.0002** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) 
Repression -0.004** 
 
 
(0.002) 
 
Party bans 
 
0.001 
  
(0.002) 
Observations 938 1,015 
Note: Autoregressive OLS model with country and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Constant, FE coefficients, and standard 
controls omitted from table. 
 
 
